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employer representatives for the "purpose of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of employee grievances."'"
Conclusion
It would appear that the result in Electrical Workers rests on
inadequate reasoning regarding the scope of section 8(b) (1)(B) as
determined by the Board and courts in earlier decisions. Although
the majority hesistantly recognized the validity of union discipline in
some cases involving supervisors, it insisted that the absolute duty
of loyalty owed by supervisors in the exercise of managerial responsi-
bilities, together with its finding that the performance of rank-and-file
struck work constituted such an exercise, necessitated a finding of an
8(b) (1) (B) violation.
It is submitted, however, that the majority in Electrical Workers
adopted an overly narrow view of the extent of permissible union
discipline. As illustrated by the Supreme Court's decisions in Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield, a union may legitimately enforce its internal
rules and regulations unless such action would contravene an express
element of the national labor laws. Although these cases involved an
interpretation of section 8(b) (1) (A) rather than 8(b) (1) (B), the
essential principles arguably remain the same for both since the de-
cisions by the Supreme Court in Scofield and Allis-Chalmers rested
upon the words "restraint or coercion" which are common to both
subsections (A) and (B) of section 8(b) (1). Finally, it should be
noted that the performance of rank-and-file work during a strike does
not fall within the definition of supervisory responsibilities as con-
tained in section 2 (11) of the NLRA. Because the fines were levied
by the union for activities not supervisory in nature, there can be no
conflict with any provision of the national labor laws designed to pro-
tect supervisors from union discipline when acting in their managerial
capacities. It is submitted that the majority in Electrical Workers
erred when they allowed the supervisors to retain all the benefits of
union membership without incurring any proportionate obligations.
DANIEL M. CRANE
Labor Law—Section 8(b) (7) (C) of the NLRA—Recognitional
Picketing—Temporary Injunction Pursuant to Section 10(i) of the
NLRA—Samoff v. Building & Construction Trades Council (Samuel
E. Long, Inc.). 1—Respondent labor organization 2 picketed a nonunion
130 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
1 346 F. Supp. 1071, 80 L.R.R.M. 3358 (ED. Pa. 1972).
2 Respondent is an unincorporated association whose membership is comprised of
delegates from craft unions and councils in the construction industry, and is a labor
organization within the meaning of 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
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general contractor in the construction industry to obtain a "subcon-
tractors agreement." Such agreements are enforceable contracts in
which a general contractor agrees that, whenever work is subcontracted
on any project, the general contractor will employ only subcontractors
who have entered into collective bargaining agreements with craft
unions affiliated with the trades council .° The picketed general contrac-
tor filed with the Regional Office of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) a charge which alleged that the labor organization was en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of section
8(b) (7) (C) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 4 Section
8(b) (7) (C) proscribes picketing by a labor organization, where an
object thereof is recognition or organization,' for more than thirty days
without the filing with the NLRB of a petition for a representation
election. Subsequently, the Regional Director proceeded in federal
district court for a temporary injunction pursuant to section 10(l) of
the NLRA.°
U.S.C. 152(5) (1970). 346 F. Supp. at 1078, 80 LRAM. at 3363. See Local 60, Iron
Workers (Nalews, Inc.), 177 N.L.R.B.•289, 291, 71 L.R.R.M. 1454 (1969); IBEW, Local
1, 164 N.L.R.B. 313, 314, 65 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1967); Building & Constr. Trades Council
(General Plumbing & Heating Co.), 155 N.L.R.B. 1184, 1186-87, 60 L.R.R.M. 1468, 1469
(1965).
8 346 F. Supp. at 1073, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3359. In the construction industry, sub-
contracting has Tong been a subject of collective bargaining agreements and disputes
between the craft unions and unionized general contractors. See Lunden, Subcontracting
Clauses in Major Contracts, pts. 1, 2, 84 Monthly Lab. Rev. 579, 715 (1961).
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization ... (7) to picket
or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any em-
ployer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize
or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or
forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor
organization as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor or-
ganization is currently certified as the representative of such employees: . . .
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section
[9(c) of the NLRA] being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed
thirty days from the commencement of such picketing • . .
6 Although "Uhl both state decisions and NLRB reasoning there has been a tendency
to distinguish picketing for recognition from organizational picketing Mlle [NLRA]
amendments wisely ignore the purely verbal distinction and treat them alike," Cox, The
Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257,
265 (1959). Consequently, for the purposes of this casenote, the terms are used inter-
changeably.
6
 29 U.S.C. 160(1) (1970) provides in part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within.the meaning of • • . section [8(b)(7) of the NLRA], the prelim-
inary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority
over all other cases except cases of like character .... If, after such investigation,
the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable
cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall,
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any
district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to
have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for ap-
propriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with
801
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
At an evidentiary hearing in district court, the respondent labor
organization contended that the picketing was not for any organiza-
tional or recognitional purpose, but rather solely to obtain the subcon-
tractors agreement.'` The NLRB maintained that, even assuming the
respondent's purpose was not specifically to organize the general con-
tractor's employees, section 8(b) (7) (C) also prohibits picketing to
obtain a subcontractors agreement.' The NLRB theory may be sum-
marized thus: respondent was admittedly seeking a contract relating
to subcontracting; the subject of subcontracting is a matter within the
statutory phrase "terms and conditions of employment"' and is thus
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; a labor organization
which seeks a contract with an employer relating to a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining is seeking recognition; and, as the respondent did
not file a petition for a representation election, its recognitional picket-
ing was violative of section 8(b) (7) (C).
Based upon a factual finding that the picketing had no purpose
other than to obtain a subcontractors agreement," the court HELD:
the sole focus of section 8(b) (7) (C) is upon picketing which has as
its objective the organization of employees by a labor organization and
recognition of that labor organization as the full collective bargaining
agent for those employees." Therefore, the court found no reasonable
cause to believe that the elements of an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of that section are present in picketing for a subcontractors
agreement." Consequently, the court denied the temporary injunction,
concluding that section 10 (l) does not require a district court "to grant
relief based upon legal theories advanced by the Board which, while
thoughtfully presented and not frivolous, are, in the view of the Court,
erroneous. ”13
After a brief examination of the legislative history and case law
concerning section 8(b) (7) (C), the purpose and coverage of that
section will be discussed in light of the opposing views of the Samuel
E. Long court and the NLRB. With the requirements for a section
10(1) temporary injunction as a focal point, the merits of the instant
case will then be analyzed.
Section 8(b) (7) was enacted in 1959 as part of the Landrum-
respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining
order as it deems just and proper . . . •
7 346 F. Supp. at 1073, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3359.
8 Id.
9 Section 8(d), 29 U.S.C.	 158(d) (1970), provides in part that "to bargain col-
lectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the represen-
tative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . ."
19 346 F. Supp. at 1076, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3361.
11 Id. at 1083, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3367.
12 Id. at 1085, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3368.
18 Id. at 1086, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3369.
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Griffin amendments to the NLRA." The provision was assertedly
prompted by evidence of "blackmail picketing."' Indeed, the legisla-
tive history emphasizes the intent to proscribe situations in which a
labor organization attempts "to secure recognition and bargaining
rights by the pressure brought on the employees or employer by a
picket line."" However, a large gap arguably exists between the pro-
fessed purpose and the operative provisions of the entire paragraph.'
For while the legislative history is replete with references to blackmail
or extortionate picketing," the actual language of section 8(b) (7) is
not confined to that context." The meaning of the language is unclear:
because "[s]ection 8(b) (7) was the product of intense conflict be-
tween competing interests [t]he resulting language is not notable for
its clarity; it has been aptly described . . . as 'confusing.' " 2° Thus, in
view of the fact that the provision is "marked by calculated and inad-
vertent ambiguities," 21 the court in Samuel E. Long understandably
relied on legislative materials to determine the type of picketing with
which Congress was concerned in 8(b) (7) . 22 Since the legislative his-
tory emphasizes blackmail picketing, the court concluded that section
8(b) (7)(C) is concerned solely with situations in which a labor orga-
nization seeks to compel an employer to accept the union-without a
14 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Amendments), tit. VII, g 704(c), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. 4 158(b) (7) (1970).
15 Samoff, Recognition and Organizational Picketing-A Wider Angle of Vision, 14
Lab. L.J. 891, 896 (1963).
15 S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1959); 1 Legislative History of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [hereinafter cited as Leg. Hist.
LMRDA] 397, 471 (1959).
17 ITU No. 57 v. NLRB, 326 F. Supp. 634, 636, 54 L.R.R.M., 2535, 2537 (D.C. Cir.
1963); cf. Witney, NLRB Membership Cleavage: Recognition and Organizational Picket-
ing, 14 Lab. L.J. 434, 457 (1963); Comment, Picketing by an Uncertified Union: The
New Section 8(b) (7), 69 Yale L.J. 1393, 1396, 1399 (1960).
18 See, e.g., 105 Cong. Rec. 1272-73, 1729-30, 1731, 6106, 6647-66; 2 Leg. Hist.
LMRDA, supra note 16, at 975-76, 993, 994-95, 1029, 1174-93 (1959). Thus, Senator
Ervin noted, at 105 Cong. Rec. 6656, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRDA 1183 (1959): "Recognition
picketing is picketing which is designed to compel the employer to accept the union as
the bargaining agent for the employees, regardless of whether the union represents a
majority of the employees."
19 For example, "under ordinary circumstances it is difficult to conceive of a pragma-
tic situation where a union's ultimate objective in picketing would not be for recognition
or organizational purposes .. , ." Graham, How Effective Is the National Labor Relations
Board?, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 1009, 1040 (1964). See also Note, Organizational and Recogni-
tion Picketing: Permissible Activity Under the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, 36 St.
John's L. Rev. 293, 301 (1962).
20 NLRB v. District Council of Carpenters, 387 F.2d 170, 174, 67 L.R.R.M. 2012,
2015 (2d Cir. 1967), quoting McLeod v. Chefs, Local 89, 286 F.2d 727, 729, 47 L.R.R.M.
2541, 2542 (2d Cir. 1961).
21 Meltzer, Organizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 78 (1962).
22 This conforms to normal principles of statutory construction, see 2 J. Sutherland,
Statutory Construction § 4503 (3d ed. 1943).
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representation election—as the full collective bargaining agent for the
employees, "and nothing less than that.""
The NLRB, on the other hand, has adopted the view that, "to an
unusual degree, the words of the statute provide the only safe measure
of the actual agreement between contending purposes and points of
view [in Congress]." 24
 Consequently, the NLRB has preferred to read
section 8 (b) (7) expansively. It has consistently maintained that picket-
ing is recognitional where a purpose is "to establish a continuing con-
tractual relationship with the employer with regard to matters which
could substantially affect the working conditions of his employees, and
which are the proper subject of bargaining by a lawfully recognized
exclusive representative of those employees."" Under this theory,
the picketing union's objective need not be an explicit grant of full
recognition, nor a collective bargaining agreement covering every
term and condition of employment;" it would suffice that the em-
ployer could avoid picketing only by acceding to union demands that
contemplate agreement to and maintenance of any significant term and
condition of employment.
In the Samuel E. Long case, therefore, the critical question, in
the NLRB's view, was whether the proposed subcontractors agreement
related to the terms and conditions of employment of the general
contractor's employees. If so, the NLRB would deem the picketing
to be recognitional. In asserting that the picketing did concern a term
or condition of employment, the NLRB relied on Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB. 27 The Supreme Court there held that an
employer's decision to contract out work otherwise performed by
regular employees is a term and condition of employment within
the meaning of section 8(d) and therefore a subject of mandatory
collective bargaining."
In contradistinction to the situation in Fibreboard, however, a
28
 346 F. Supp. at 1083, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3367.
24
 Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB,
415 F.2d 656, 658, 72 L.R.R.M. 2149, 2151 (9th Cir. 1969). See Cox, supra note 5, at 266:
"The very few men close to the drafting of the Conference Report who understood this
problem had no common intention—perhaps 'had conflicting intentions' would be a
better phrase."
as Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v, NLRB,
415 F.2d 656, 658-59, 72 L.R.R.M. 2149, 2151 (9th Cir. 1969) ; see also id. at 659 n.6,
72 L.R.R.M. at 2151 n.6.
Cases in which the Board dismissed 8(b) (7) (C) charges against construction trades
councils which picketed to force a general contractor to cease doing business with non-
union subcontractors are distinguished on the basis that the aim of the picketing in those
cases was merely to remove the nonunion subcontractors from the particular job site
and was not to obtain a continuing agreement with the general contractor. See IBEW,
Local 903 (Pass Dev., Inc.), 154 N.L.R.B. 169, 59 L.R.R.M. 1722 (1965); Building &
Constr. Trades Council (Winwake, Inc.), 141 N.L,R.B. 38, 52 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1963).
28
 Samoff v. Building & Constr. Trades Council (Samuel E. Long, Inc.), 346 F.
Supp. 1073, 1080, 80 L.R.R.M. 3358, 3364 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
27
 379 U.S. 203, 57 L.R.R.M. 2609 (1964).
28
 Id. at 209, 57 L.R.R.M. at 2611.
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subcontractors agreement does not relate directly to the decision to
contract out work.29
 The agreement does not require a general con-.
tractor to subcontract, nor does it forbid the general contractor to do
so. Under such an agreement, the general contractor is free to sub-
contract or not to subcontract. The only restriction imposed concerns
the organizational status of any subcontractor. Fibreboard held that
the decision to subcontract is a mandatory subject of bargaining; it
did not hold that the employer must bargain about the union status
of those to whom work is subcontracted. Thus Fibreboard is not
truly apposite in determining whether or not picketing for a sub-
contractors agreement is picketing over a term and condition of em-
ployment of the general contractor's employees.8°
Perhaps realizing that Fibreboard does not fully support the
proposition asserted for it, the NLRB had maintained in a previous
case that it is immaterial to its view of section 8(b)(7) whether the
subject of the proposed subcontractors agreement is mandatory or
permissive (i.e., not forbidden), so long as it has a "substantial impact"
upon the interests of the general contractor's employees.' Yet, if the
bargaining status of a subcontractors agreement were in fact im-
material, a question remains as to why the NLRB would make the
mandatory nature of the bargaining a major element in its Samuel E.
Long argument. The obvious reason is, certainly, to tie the Board's
argument more closely to the wording of 8(b) (7), which specifically
uses the terms "bargain" and "collective bargaining" to indicate sub-
jects of a mandatory nature. An additional reason may perhaps be
that, despite the previous attempts of the NLRB to gain a favorable
ruling, no court has yet adopted the proposition that 8(b) (7) applies
to permissive subjects of bargaining and found a violation where the
29 "Bargaining about the decision means discussing with the union the question
whether there will be subcontracting at all." 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Rela-
tions Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 771, 853 n.5 (1967).
88 It may nevertheless be argued that a subcontractors agreement does relate to a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining in light of the construction industry proviso to
§ 8(e) of the NLRA. That proviso specifically exempts, from the general prohibition
against "hot cargo" contracts, "an agreement between a labor organization and an em-
ployer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work
to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). See Comment, Hot Cargo
Agreements under the National Labor Relations Act: An Analysis of Section 8(e), 38
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 97 (1963). In construing the proviso, courts have held that a recognized
union may picket to compel the unionized general contractor to subcontract only to
union subcontractors. See District Council of Carpenters v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 636, 641,
56 L.R.R.M. 2091, 2094 (3d Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB,
328 F.2d 534, 537, 55 L.R.R.M. 2293, 2295 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Laborers, Local 383 v.
NLRB, 323 F.2d 422, 426, 54 L.R.R.M. 2246, 2249 (9th Cir. 1963). See also 105 Cong.
Rec. 17900, 2 Leg. Hist. LMRDA 1433 (1959). Consequently, although there is no
specific precedent in support, a subcontractors agreement could arguably relate to a term
or condition of employment.
81
 Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677, 680 n.6, 68
L.R.R.M. 2019, 2021 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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subject 'at issue was clearly not mandatory. Consequently, to drop the
argument as to the mandatory nature of a subcontractors agreement
would appear as an overt move to expand 8(b) (7) coverage to include
subjects of permissive bargaining.
The court in Samuel E. Long did not, however, question the
NLRB's interpretation of the Fibreboard holding. Instead, the court
challenged: the "substantial impact" claim, concluding that the sub-
contractors agreement would have "relatively small effect . . . on the
ability of [the general contractor's] employees to engage in the full
panoply of normal bargaining functions!" 82
The case upon which the NLRB primarily relied to demonstrate
substantial impact in the proposed agreement was Dallas Building &
Construction Trades Council v. NLRB Ss
 There, the various recognized
unions had previously sought subcontracting clauses, but uniformly
abandoned the demand in return for other concessions." Subsequently,
a trades council sought a subcontracting agreement on behalf of all
the member unions, picketed for that objective, and was cited for un-
fair labor practices pursuant to section 8(b) (7) (A)8 5 The full Board
unanimously found that the "subcontracting proposal would signifi-
cantly affect employees of the picketed general contractors to the
extent that it regulated subcontracting of such work."" The District
of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board's order and "expressed its
agreement with the Board that the proscriptions of section 8(b) (7) (A)
are not confined to the blackmail-picketing context!" 87 Further, the
court specifically approved the Board's rationale that any subcon-
tracting clause would " 'take away an opportunity for the recognized
unions to either bargain for or trade off subcontracting controls.' " 38
The probability that the employees would benefit from the agreement
was thought "irrelevant" since the agreement nonetheless "would bind
the employer with respect to a matter about which the recognized union
may bargain as exclusive representative of the employees!'"
The Dallas interpretation was adopted by a divided panel of the
Ninth Circuit in Lane-Coos-Curry-Douglas Counties Building & Con-
82 346 F. Supp. at 1081, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3365.
88 396 F.2d 677, 68 L.R.R.M. 2019 (D.C. Cir. 1968), enforcing 164 N.L.R.B. 938,
65 L.R.R.M. 1170 (1967).
84 164 N.L.R.B. at 940.
85 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(7) (A) (1970), proscribes picketing where "the employer has
lawfully recognized in accordance with [the NLRA] any other labor organization and
a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section [9(c)
of the NLRA] . • . ."
80 164 N.L.R.B. at 942, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1171. The Board noted, for example, that
"[w]ithout such an agreement, the general contractors might choose to employ fewer
laborers and millwrights, obtaining the remainder of the requisite manpower through
subcontractors not bound to unions affiliated with the Council." Id.
87 1968-1969 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Law, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
785, 885 (1969).
as 396 F.2d at 681, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2022, quoting 164 N.L.R.B. at 941.
89 396 F.2d at 680-81, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2022.
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struction Trades Council v. NLRB,4° which also arose under 8(b) (7)
(A)." There again, it was held that "picketing to secure a continuing
agreement with respect to [the] subject matter [of subcontracting]
intruded upon the area reserved to collective bargaining . . . . 1)42
The Samuel E. Long court apparently conceded that picketing for
a subcontractors agreement would be recognitional within the rationale
of Dallas and Lane-Coos, but concluded that those cases were dis-
tinguishable since they involved violations of section 8 (b) (7) (A), i.e.,
picketing when the employer is already party to a collective bar-
gaining agreement with another union, which agreement bars an NLRB
conducted election. This basis for distinction appears faulty. The
structure of section 8(b) (7) reveals that the essential element of a
violation common to all the subparagraphs is that an object of the
picketing is recognition. Once the recognitional objective has been
established, the type of violation will depend merely on whether sub-
paragraph (A), (B), or (C) is applicable. As the Board has noted,
"structurally, as well as grammatically, subparagaphs (A), (B) and
(C) are subordinate to and controlled by the opening phrases of
Section 8(b) (7). 1"
On this basis, it is submitted that the actual ground for the court's
attack on Dallas and Lane-Coos was not the distinguishable charac-
teristics of those decisions, but the court's belief that the cases were
decided erroneously. The court correctly noted that Lane-Coos directly
follows the Dallas interpretation;" thus, Lane-Coos can be considered
as valid only if its predecessor is first found to be so. 46 The Samuel E.
Long court reached the conclusion that Dallas incorrectly read the
case upon which it relied as authority for its holding and accordingly
was itself unreliable.
The case upon which Dallas rested is Centralia Building & Con-
struction Trades Council v. NLRB." That decision enforced a Board
4° 415 F.2d 656, 72 L.R.R.M. 2149 (9th Cir. 1969).
41
 The dissent in Lane-Coos found both Dallas and the Lane-Coos majority to have
ignored the fact that subcontractors agreements are legal under the construction industry
proviso of 8(e), see note 30 supra. 415 F.2d at 663, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2154-55. The
mere legality of a subcontractors agreement is, however, of no consequence to an 8(b) (7)
unfair labor practice charge. That the picketing may have legitimate, as well as proscribed,
objectives is immaterial, since the existence of "an object" forbidden by the NLRA is
sufficient for a finding that the picketing violates 8(b) (7). NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters,
314 F.2d 53, 58-59, 52 L.R.R.M. 2354, 2356-57 (2d Cir. 1963); Local 346, Leather Goods
Union v. Compton, 292 F.2d 313, 317, 48 L.R.R.M. 2678, 2681 (1st Cir. 1961).
42 415 F.2d at 659, 72 L.R.R.M. at 2151.
43 Hod Carriers, Local 840 (C.A. Blinne Constr. Co.), 135 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1159, 49
L.R.R.M. 1638, 1641 (1962).
44 346 F. Supp. at 1081, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3365.
45 This argument follows from the Lane-Coos dissent which found that the majority
had mistakenly "assumeIdi Dallas to have been correctly decided." 415 F.2d at 663, 72
L.R.R.M, at 2154.
46 363 F.2d 699, 62 L.R.R.M. 2511 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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order based upon a Board determination 47 that picketing a nonunion
employer to obtain an agreement obligating the employer to pay union
scale wages and fringe benefits was recognitional and therefore viola-
tive of 8(b) (7) (C). Centralia thus involved not a one-subject issue
such as subcontracting, but instead dealt with numerous terms of em-
ployment which are clearly the typical subjects of mandatory collec-
tive bargaining. Yet, in language which was relied upon by. the NLRB
in Samuel E. Long," the Dallas court stated:
Centralia, however, does not mean that Section 8(b) (7) is
violated only when the picketing union seeks to preempt the
entire scope of interest of a recognized representative of the
employees. The thrust of Centralia is that, so long as the union
seeks a contract dealing with a subject relating to the
conditions of employment of the general contractors' own
employees, the picketing is recognitional within Section
8(b)(7)"
The Samuel E. Long court, on the other hand, read the Centralia
holding more restrictively: the extent to which the picketing organiza-
tion is seeking to assume normal collective bargaining functions with
regard to the general contractor's employees is determinative of whether
the picketing has a lawful or unlawful objective 6 0 The court saw Dallas
as "extending the Centralia rule,"5' a "rule" which the court, in any
event, considered incorrect insofar as it implied that picketing for
something less than "full collective bargaining agent" status can have
a "recognitional purpose.'
"Full collective bargaining agent" status represents the core of
the Samuel E. Long decision. It is the court's position that
there is no provision in the scheme of things established by
the [NLRA] and implemented by the Board for employees
to select a representative to bargain for them on one sub-
ject, such as subcontracting. . . . [F]or, had Congress meant
to proscribe picketing by § 8(b) (7) (C) other than for pur-
poses of organization and recognition in the conventional
sense, i.e., to organize employees and compel the employer
to recognize the union as their bargaining agent, it would
not have geared § 8(b) (7) (C) violations to failure to file
a § 9(c) representation petition which leads to a Board
supervised election."
47 Centralia Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Pac. Sign & Steel Bldg. Co.), 155
N.L.R.B. 803, 60 L.R.R.M. 1430 (1965).
48 346 F. Supp. at 1081, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3365.
40 396 F.2d at 683, 68 L.R.R.M. at 2023.
346 F. Supp. at 1081, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3365. "We view the Centralia case as
setting forth this proposition and nothing more." Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1083, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3367.
68 Id., 80 L.R.R.M. at 3366-67.
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This argument—that picketing for any goal that is not the equiv-
alent of status as full collective bargaining agent is not violative of
8(b) (7) (C)—is not unpersuasive. The .Board's contrasting view ad-
mittedly also presents a reasonable reading of section 8(b) (7). It is
well recognized, however, that the entire 8(b) (7) provision is am-
biguous" and poorly drafted," and under such circumstances the
Samuel E. Long court was fully warranted in rejecting the Board's
position and drawing its interpretation from the supportive legislative
history. Clearly that interpretation is contrary to the holding of
Dallas and Lane-Coos. Yet, in light of the NLRB's continued expan-
sion of 8(b) (7) coverage—in Centralia, Dallas, Lane-Coos, and cul-
minating in the instant case—the court's view in Samuel E. Long,
supported as it is by the legislative history, would appear the better of
the two. It may be that picketing for a subcontractors agreement by a
trades council is an evil in terms of national labor policy. Yet it is
for Congress, and not the NLRB, to proscribe such picketing by
making appropriate changes in the NLRA. 5°
Nevertheless, the crucial issue before the court in Samuel E. Long
should not have been whether Dallas, or for that matter Centralia,
was decided erroneously. The district court's function under section
10(1) is very limited." The Samuel E. Long court recognized that
limited role," but its decision belies the court's understanding.
Section 10(l) embodies the determination of Congress that cer-
tain unfair labor practices give or tend to give rise to such serious
interruptions of commerce as to require their discontinuance, pending
adjudication by the Board, to avoid irreparable injury to the policies
of the NLRA and the frustration of the statutory purpose which would
otherwise result." As part of section 10(1), Congress imposed a man-
datory duty upon the NLRB to seek injunctive relief in the appropriate
4 Meltzer, supra note 21, at 78.
55 A. Cox, Law and the National Labor Policy 31 (1969).
58 It is now [fourteen] years since the Landrum-Griffin Amendments . . .
Perhaps Congress should look again at the matter of picketing in the building
trades industry—at the new patterns of picketing which have developed in the
interim—and In the furtherance of its policy-making role, enact a more com-
prehensive and consistent regulatory scheme than it has heretofore.
Samuel E. Long, Inc., 346 F. Supp. at 1086, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3369.
57
 "The injunctive function under the act has been analogized to 'the historic func-
tion of the grand jury, where it must determine probable cause for a man to be tried'
Such a determination compels a 'stopgap' injunction pending Board determination of
the merits." Comment, Extent of Discretion Exercised by District Courts in Issuing
Temporary injunctions Against Alleged Unfair Labor Practices, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 102,
107 (1957).
58 346 F. Supp. at 1074 n.1, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3359 n.1. Note, Temporary Injunctive
Relief Under Section 10(1) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 460, 466, 474
(1963).
55
 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 27 (1947) ; 1 Legislative History of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 414, 433 (1948).
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district court upon a reasonable belief that a violation of section
8(b) (7) has occurred 90
' It is well settled that in a proceeding under section 10(l) the
district court is not called upon to decide the merits of an unfair
labor practice case." The district court's inquiry is limited to deter-
mination of whether (1) the evidence adduced at any evidentiary
hearing, and (2) the propositions of law relied upon by the NLRB,
demonstrate at least "reasonable cause to believe" that the respondent
labor organization is violating the NLRA as charged. 62 The court in
Samuel E. Long, however, went beyond this role. In rejecting the legal
theory presented by the NLRB as "erroneous" even though it recog-
nized that theory as "thoughtfully presented and not frivolous," 63
the court added an apparently unwarranted third requirement for a
section 10(l) injunction. It is submitted that this "erroneous" test
is merely a semantic manipulation which permits the district court
to evade the otherwise clear standards set by the statute and the
6° See note 6 supra.
411 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 681-83, 28
L.R.R.M. 2108, 2111 (1951) (adverse district court decision in section 10(1) temporary
injunction proceeding not res judicata in the unfair labor practice case subsequently
heard by the Board).
This lack of adjudication on the merits raises some of the traditional objections
to use of the labor injunction. The force of these objections is perhaps minimized,
however, by the fact that an injunction under section 10(1) is sought on only a
small percentage of the charges filed under section 8(b) (4), and that because of
care taken by the Board in investigation of the facts and verification of the
law-often with legal advice from the General Counsel in Washington-the in-
junction frequently is not issued until a month or so after filing of the charge.
Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 Kan. L. Rev.
651, 705 (1971) (footnotes omitted). This statement applies with equal force to 10(1)
petitions based on 8(b) (7) (C) charges. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1972, 295
charges were filed under 8(b) (7) (C), but during this same period only fifteen petitions
for injunctions under section 10(1) were filed on 8(b) (7) (C) charges, of which only one
was denied. The balance were granted (9), settled (3), or dismissed voluntarily (2).
37 NLRB Ann. Rep. App., Tables 2, 20 (1972).
02 In a decision which is binding upon the court in Samuel E. Lang, the Third
Circuit held:
The Board need not show that an unfair labor practice has been committed, but
need only demonstrate that there is reasonable cause to believe that the elements
of an unfair labor practice are present. Nor need the Board conclusively show
the validity of the propositions of law underlying its charge; it is required to
demonstrate merely that the propositions of law which it has applied to the
charge are substantial and not frivolous.
Saadiler v. Local 1291, ILA, 292 F.2d 182, 187, 48 L.R.R.M. 2434, 2437 (3d Cir. 1961).
Cited as controlling, Cuneo v. Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 300 F.2d 832, 834 n.4, 49
L.R.R.M. 2879, 2880 n.4 (3d Cir. 1962). Quoted with approval, McLeod v. Local 282,
Teamsters, 345 F.2d 142, 145, 59 L.R.R.M. 2234, 2236-37 (2d Cir. 1965); Local Joint Ed.,
Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75, 77, 54 L.R.R.M. 2298, 2299 (8th
Cir. 1963). Cited with approval in more recent decisions, e.g.: Sachs v. Local 48,
Plumbers, 454 F.2d 879, 883, 79 L.R.R.M. 2321, 2323 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Terminal Freight
Cooperative Ass'n v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1099, 1102, 78 L.R.R.M. 2097, 2099 (3d Cir.. 1971);
Kennedy v. 1TU Local 174, 418 F.2d 6, 8, 72 L.R.R.M. 2506, 2507 (9th Cir. 1969).
83 346 F. Supp. at 1086, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3369.
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courts." In the scheme of national labor relations policy, interpretation
of unfair labor practice provisions and determinaton of cases arising
thereunder, with respect to both issues of fact and of law, is not a
function of the district court, but is reserved exclusively to the Board,"
subject to review by the courts of appeals."
It is not suggested that a district court must grant a temporary
injunction under section 10(l) merely upon a Regional Director's
allegation that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation
of section 8(b) (7) (C) has occurred. Certainly the Regional Director
must demonstrate that "the elements of an unfair labor practice are
present" and the petition must be supported by propositions of law
which are "substantial and not frivolous."" Nonetheless, "in light of
the congressional policy favoring the grant of such injunctions,"" even
if convinced that its own interpretation of section 8(b) (7) (C) was
the better view, the Samuel E. Long court should have granted the
temporary injunction" where it admittedly found the NLRB's legal
theory was "thoughtfully presented and not frivolous!'"
PAUL D. BRENNER
04 "The primary task of the trial court in a 10(1) case is to determine 'reasonable
cause' by examining the facts of the case with reference to the law as it had been developed
by the Board and its reviewing courts." McLeod v. National Maritime Union, 457 F.2d
490, 494, 79 L.R.R.M. 2950, 2953 (2d Cir. 1972).
05
 McLeod v. Local 25, IBEW, 344 F.2d 634, 638, 59 L.R.R.M. 2170, 2173 (2d
Cir. 1965); Terminal Freight Cooperative Ass'n v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1099, 1103, 78
L.R.R.M. 2097, 2099 (3d Cir. 1971); Sachs v. Local 48, Plumbers 454 F.2d 879, 882, 79
L.R.R.M. 2321, (4th Cir. 1972); Retail Store Union v. Rains, 266 F.2d 503, 505, 44
L.R.R.M. 2040, 2041 (5th Cir. 1959); Radio & Television Artists v. Getreu, 258 F.2d
698, 694, 42 L.R.R.M. 2693, 2694-95 (6th Cir. 1958); Madden v. Hod Carriers, Local 41,
277 F.2d 688, 690, 46 L.R.R.M. 2181, 2182 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863, 46
L.R.R.M. 3091 (1960); Solien v. Miscellaneous Drivers, Local 610, 440 F.2d 124, 129,
76 L.R.R.M. 2780, 2783 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905, 77 L.R.R.M. 2403
(1971); Kennedy v. Teamsters, Local 542, 443 F.2d 627, 630, 77 L.R.R.M. 2607, 2609
(9th Cir. 1971).
00 Pursuant to El 10(e), (f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. H 160(e), (1) (1970). See
authorities cited in note 65 supra.
07 SChadner v. Local 1291, ILA, 292 F.2d 182, 187, 48 L.R.R.M. 2434, 2437 (3d
Cir. 1961).
68
 National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127, 1133, 79
L.R.R.M. 2954, 2959 (2d Cir. 1972).
69
 Although appellate review of an order granting a l 10(l) injunction is limited to a
determination of whether a district court was "clearly erroneous" in finding reasonable
cause to believe that the NLRA was violated and whether the district court abused its
discretion in granting the requested injunctive relief, it has been held that the scope of
review is not so limited when an injunction is denied. Id. at 1133-34, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2959.
See also Local 83, Drivers Union v. Jenkins, 308 F.2d 516, 517 n.1, 51 L.R.R.M. 2177,
2179 n.1 (9th Cir. 1962).
7° 346 F. Supp. at 1086, 80 L.R.R.M. at 3369. It is worthy of note that, subsequent
to the district court's denial of the temporary injunction, an administrative law judge
heard the unfair labor practice charge. The subcontractors agreement picketing was
found to be in violation of 8(b) (7) (C) on the authority of Dallas. Building & Constr.
Trades Council (Samuel E. Long, Inc.), 1973 CCH NLRB 11 24,984 (1972). That finding
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was approved, almost without comment, by a three-member panel of the Board. See
Building & Constr. Trades Council (Samuel E. Long, Inc.), 201 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 82
L.R.R.M. 1218 (1973).
Subsequent to submission of this note for publication, the Third Circuit reversed
the instant decision. Samoff v. Building & Constr. Trades Council (Samuel E. Long, Inc.),
F.2d 82 L.R.R.M. 2790 (3rd Cir. 1973). The court ruled that the district court
had misinterpreted Schauflier and applied an incorrect standard under 10(1). The court
necessarily did not reach the underlying 8(b) (7) (C) issue.
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